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Wherefore Disinterestedness?
The concept of aesthetic disinterestedness is surely one of the axioms of modern Western
aesthetics, if not its central principle. Developed mainly in the eighteenth century in the
writings of Alison, Shaftesbury, Addison, Hutcheson and others of the British school, the
notion of disinterestedness denoted the perception of an object "for its own sake." This
central idea became the mark of a new and distinctive mode of experience called the
aesthetic, a kind of experience that was distinguished from more common modes, such as
practical, cognitive, moral, and religious experience. During the same century many of
these writers grouped what we now call the fine arts into a generally accepted set in which
they were all organized by the same principles and could be compared with one another.[1]
Finally, in the latter part of the century and especially in Germany, the general theory of
the fine arts achieved the status of a separate discipline and, in the work of Kant, came to
occupy a distinct and integral place in a philosophical system. Kant's formulation of
disinterestedness is generally regarded as definitive:
"...[T]aste in the beautiful is alone a disinterested and free satisfaction; for no interest,
either of sense or of reason, here forces our assent...Taste is the faculty of judging of an
object or a method of representing it by an entirely disinterested satisfaction or
dissatisfaction. The object of such satisfaction is called beautiful."[2]
Even though axioms claim eternal verity, we now understand them as human
constructions. As such, they have historical origins and relevance. I believe that aesthetics
today labors under the burden of a conceptual apparatus that has lost its relevance and
impedes our ability to understand and appreciate the arts, especially their recent
developments. It also obstructs our appreciative experience of other human creations, such
as built environments, agricultural landscapes, industrial sites, and the like. It is important
to add that appreciation need not always be positive. Indeed, aesthetics can provide the
basis for a powerful critique of human actions and their products that demean human
values and devastate large parts of the human habitat.
What might we say is the historical significance of aesthetic disinterestedness?
Disinterestedness served to identify intrinsic normative experience. As first developed it
was used in a moral context to help the recognition of things and actions that were good in
themselves, apart from their usefulness. Thus Shaftesbury, who, along with Hutcheson and
Alison, was one of the principal contributors to this view, contrasted "the disinterested love
of God," a love pursued for its own sake, with the more common motive of serving God "for
interest merely." The disinterested love of God has, then, value that is entirely intrinsic.[3]
When applied to the experience of beauty, it denoted the same recognition of intrinsic
value. There is a valid insight here, for we often find ourselves valuing a work of art for its
own sake. Somehow the value of good art seems to be self-contained. The work commands
respect and admiration in itself, apart from practical considerations such as monetary
value, the conferring of social status, or its association with the hand of genius.
Coming from a time when art served the purposes of church, state, and aristocracy, this

doctrine was liberating. It offered an opportunity to throw off, however briefly, the cares of
commerce and politics during a period of great industrial and social change.
Disinterestedness, moreover, was combined with other, related ideas into a new aesthetic,
especially the contemplative ideal of appreciation and the isolation of its object from
practical uses. These ideas lent themselves later to new movements and intellectual
fashions, such as art pour l'art and formalist criticism of art.
This is not the place to expatiate on the long, complex, and fascinating history of the idea
of disinterestedness.[4] The question here is how to understand the role that
disinterestedness played at this point in the history of aesthetic thought and its relevance
for the present. I contend that modern aesthetics, insofar as it is grounded on
disinterestedness and related notions, is obsolescent if not altogether obsolete. It cannot
adequately account for much in the contemporary development of the arts, for the
aesthetic appeal of the natural world, or for the aesthetic manifestations of industrial
cultures. The aesthetics of disinterestedness offers an escape from those domains rather
than an enlivening understanding of how art works.
To be sure, these traditional notions possess some valid insights into aesthetic experience.
One is that attention should be intently focused on the situation and not distracted by
features or factors irrelevant to the aesthetic occasion. A casual, wandering gaze or a
dwelling on associations that distract one from the perceptual situation diminish the effect
of the art. And there is the recognition that there are objects that possess intrinsic value.
These concerns apply in all cases and to all theories. Of course, appreciating art or nature
has its distinctive character, but the Kantian strategy is not one that serves well to identify
it.
Moreover, these common notions in aesthetics lead to serious pitfalls. One is the
transformation of experience into an intellectual puzzle that compromises the perceptual
immediacy at the heart of aesthetic. Another is the tendency to fragment the aesthetic
situation into separate elements, typically the beholder on one side and the art object on
the other, elements that then need to be related and reconciled. Such a division has
created many of the "problems" that dog much philosophical aesthetics, among them
problems concerning emotion, representation, expression, and the like. Characterizing
appreciation as ideally contemplative is misleading and unnecessary. An activist,
participatory sense of aesthetic appreciation does not exclude an attitude of thoughtful,
receptive regard when that is conjoined with intense, focused attention to the ongoing
course of experience.
Such 'contemplation' is as participatory as walking through a building or accompanying a
violinist in a Beethoven sonata. The art, the object, and the situation determine what mode
or style of appreciative engagement is most appropriate. One can still easily distinguish
aesthetic engagement from acquisitive or manipulative motives and responses, but at the
same time we can recognize and appreciate those many instances in which a powerful
aesthetic dimension inheres in practical or telic (i.e. "interested") activities. This fusion of
the aesthetic and the practical that often occurs is something that disinterestedness cannot
accommodate. Yet practical concerns are a significant factor in all the crafts, in design, and
in architecture. Elements of practice may also be an inseparable element in all the arts
involving overt performance. These explicitly exhibit the fusion of art and practice, a fusion
that at its most successful approaches the overwhelming incalculability of the sublime. This
"practical" dimension doesn't make performance or the crafts any less aesthetic. Indeed, all
artistic making involves such considerations, pace Croce and Collingwood. On the contrary,
I think it points up a dimension of all the arts and their experience that is traditionally
overlooked or undervalued.
Thus intrinsic value need not be exclusive but can occur in harmonious juxtaposition with
instrumental concerns. A fine painting may ennoble a room; a sculpture may sacralize the
surrounding space. The moral effects of theater, literature, and music have been
recognized since Plato. Furthermore, there is no need to sacrifice the distinctive, complex
quality of aesthetic appreciation without separating such experience from its other modes.
We can retain intense attention, perceptual acuity, wonder, and the raptness of powerful
aesthetic occasions without the necessity of erecting a separate mode of experience to
account for it. Surely, too, we can acknowledge the complexity of aesthetic experience
without relying on the constraints of the Kantian formula to do it for us.

Better an account that is least assumptive, that explains difficulties rather than creating
them, and that remains true to descriptive experience. I believe that a non-Kantian account
such as I have sketched out here and developed at length elsewhere succeeds in these
ways.
Endnotes
[1] Paul Oskar Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts," in Renaissance Thought II (New
York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 163-227.
[2] Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment (l790), Sect. 5. For an extended critical account
see A. Berleant, "The Historicity of Aesthetics I," The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol.26,
No.2 (Spring 1986), 101-111; "The Historicity of Aesthetics II," The British Journal of
Aesthetics, Vol.26, No.3 (Summer 1986), 195-203; and "Beyond Disinterestedness." The
British Journal of Aesthetics, 34/3 (July 1994).
[3] Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics, ed. Robertson (London, 1900), II, 55, 56.
The definitive discussion of this history is Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Origins of 'Aesthetic
Disinterestedness'," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XX, 2 (Winter 1961), 131143. The history of the idea of disinterestedness continues to be debated. See my Art and
Engagement, Ch. 1, esp. n. 3, pp. 215-216.
[4] Some basic sources of this history are discussed in A. Berleant, "The Historicity of
Aesthetics," I and II. The important literature on the history of disinterestedness includes
Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Origin of 'Aesthetic Disinterestedness';" Remy Saisselin, "A
Second Note on Eighteenth Century 'Aesthetic Disinterestedness'," Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism XXI/2 (1962), 209; "George Dickie, "Stolnitz Attitude: Taste and
Perception," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 43/2 (1984), 105-203; Jerome
Stolnitz, "The Aesthetic Attitude in the Rise of Modern Aesthetics--Again," Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 43/2 (1984), 205-208; Dabney Townsend, Aesthetic Objects
and Works of Art; "From Shaftesbury to Kant," Journal of the History of Ideas, 48, 2; and
"Archibald Alison: Aesthetic Experience and Emotion," British Journal of Aesthetics, 28/2
(1988), 132-144.
_______________________________________________________________________
Ronald Hepburn
Response to Arnold Berleant on Disinterestedness
Arnold Berleant presents a many-sided and attractive case for "engagement" rather than
"disinterestedness" as fundamental to aesthetic appreciation, whether of art or nature. A
disinterested attitude may, he thinks, have been appropriate to eighteenth-century art and
aesthetics, but today both philosophy and the arts must free themselves of its outmoded
influence. In his Art and Engagement, Berleant gave examples from recent art of works
that require active participation from the appreciator, "wall pieces, paintings, and
sculptures . . . that respond to environmental stimuli, emitting sounds, echoes, or light at
[one's] approach" (pp. 26-27). This is of course true not only of the art of today: sculpture
and architecture, as Berleant well knows, have always invited, even required the
appreciator to walk around them, or through them, so as to build up a many-facetted
experience. Why then do I have some uneasiness about his readiness to displace
disinterestedness?
Disinterestedness need not be thought of as a "separate mode of experience." It plays
more roles than one, for instance, in the demarcating of aesthetic from non-aesthetic, art
from non-art. It involves a snipping or displacing of attention from our individual lifeconcerns, from our acquisitive urges, from questions about the actual existence of the
objects and the situations depicted or symbolized in and through works of art.
Disinterestedness (says Berleant) leads to the "transformation of experience into an
intellectual puzzle that loses sight of the perceptual immediacy at the heart of [the]
aesthetic". But that "perceptual immediacy" (I want to respond) is not so unreflective as to
bypass the appreciator's recognition that the perception belongs to art (as an ongoing
sequence of genres and traditions and styles) and is not to be integrated with practical
living. That is to say, there is a sensed discontinuity or disinterestedness, but not one that
is inimical to the sensory component of aesthetic experience. So too with aesthetic

appreciation of nature: we suspend our utility-dealings with nature, suspend equally our
pleasure-seeking recreational encounter with it, and disinterestedly appreciate nature's
own qualities. We can certainly be animated in that appreciation and enjoy an intense
emotional response to art and to nature: we can be active in aesthetic exploration, but all
within the awareness, once again, of that discontinuity from our other engagements-with
work, personal relationships, amusement. We may move through, be immersed in, the
ever-changing, turbulent nature we aesthetically appreciate, and yet be aware also of a
contemplative, calm still centre in our consciousness. Paradox is hard to avoid: we
experience, at different levels, both animation and stillness.
So construed, an aesthetic of disinterestedness does justice to the distinctness of the
worlds of art from the non-art world, and the distinctness of aesthetic from non-aesthetic
approaches to nature. In non-representational music, I experience the sequence of
emotional qualities, tensions and resolutions, as belonging to the music itself. In a painting,
the world represented is, in the end, not my own world with its objects, happenings,
dramas, but, once more, the world of the painting itself. Besides, in appreciating the
painting, I attend not only to the items represented but also to the spaces between and
around them, and I let the whole painting, all of its components interacting, modify my
perception, and create, it may be, a unique expressive quality, which is available to me
nowhere else.
In other words, one's first aesthetic obligation, in considering any part of a work of art, is
to take its bearings, to grasp its place, its meaning, its emotional qualities, in relation to
the rest of that art-work on which one is concentrating. (That is not to deny that the work
as a whole may well be related additionally to the world beyond it, on which it may
comment.) Art-works, then, are not, so to speak, wired directly into the system of my
desires, longings and satisfactions. There surely is some "standing back" here; at least
enough to allow me to bring into a synthesis, a single grasp, what is often a multitude of
interdependent components.
In the area of emotions, feelings and moods, there is an important difference-again well
marked out by the concepts of disinterestedness and discontinuity-between simply
suffering an emotion, on the one hand (let's say, a vague and confused fear of the
inevitability of death), and having that emotion clarified, articulated, in a work of art, and
so better grasped. In grasping it through fictive situations analogous to our own but
sufficiently distanced, we are delivered, at least in part, from our debilitating passivity.
It should be clear now why I see disinterestedness as having several roles to play in an
account of aesthetic experience: a formal role in indicating a boundary between aesthetic
and other modes of experience, an epistemological role in characterizing that discontinuity,
that particular posture of consciousness with which we can make most, and most
appropriate, sense of complex art-objects, or attend to items of nature in a distinctively
aesthetic mode. Still further, it would be rewarding if we could be aware of affinities (today
less familiar and less obvious) between aesthetic disinterestedness and an overcoming of
the anxious flux of everyday events and the "interested" activity (self-interested, most
often) that aims, but fails, to bring calm out of conflict. In this respect, we can learn from
Schopenhauer, though our metaphysic is bound to be different from his. For Schopenhauer,
the aesthetic (creating and appreciating), because it is not enmeshed in our personal
strivings, offers release, even if temporary, from "will", whether our own will or that of the
blindly wilful "in-itself" of the cosmos as he understood it.
Surely, you may say, my readiness to accept the story about aesthetic experience as
disinterested, in the sense of discontinuous with the non-aesthetic life of doing and
suffering, is most obviously flawed when we try to apply it to the range of daunting and
momentous experiences which have traditionally been called "sublime" (in nature or in art).
Typically, in these we find ourselves confronted by the spatial or temporal vast, or by the
immense forces of nature. Can there really be room here for a disinterested stance or a
sense of discontinuity.? I think that we can distinguish two aspects of the sublime (in its
very roughly Kantian dual form) which do connect significantly with the cluster of ideas
centred on disinterestedness.
First: the daunting object of a sublime experience can seem to stand quite apart from, to
be quite incommensurable with, the categories of our ordinary experience: a remote and
immense snow-capped mountain peak, a supernova or a black hole. Secondly, the total

experience called sublime, in this tradition, powerfully sensuous though that experience
may be, can by no means be seen simply as our being "bowled over," stunned,
overwhelmed by excessive magnitude or by nature's energies. A further component is
fused with that moment of sheer sensory impact-a realization (it can take different forms)
that we are not pure vulnerability only, but conscious beings, free and reflective beings,
mysteriously able to summon resources of intellect and imagination, which "balance" and in
a measure "distance" that daunting sensory impact, and fuse both components into the one
complex-daunting-and-exhilarating-experience of the sublime.
Looking back, my impression is that Arnold Berleant and I are not so far apart as is
suggested by our taking opposed positions over "disinterestedness." Each of us wishes to
accommodate many of the same features of aesthetic experience, though under different
overarching concepts or categories. But the differences do matter: they may even
determine how willing or unwilling we shall be to welcome particular radical innovations in
the arts. I do not accept the view that aesthetics must be ready to remodel itself in
response to any and every trend or fashion in "the contemporary development of the arts."
It is possible that philosophers of art may, on occasion, speak out legitimately as critics of
particular trends, having greater confidence in certain principles and values than in the
worthwhileness of art which flouts or discards them. Inevitably, those principles and values
will have been brought to light through the work of particular authors at particular times.
But it cannot follow that what they excogitated had relevance to their own time only (nor,
of course, that it necessarily applies to ours!).[1]
Endnote
[1] On disinterestedness and the aesthetic appreciation of nature, see also Emily Brady,
"Don't Eat the Daisies: Disinterestedness and the Situated Aesthetic," in Environmental
Values 7 (1998), pp. 97-114.
_________________________________________________________________________
Arnold Berleant
A Reply to Hepburn
As I began to ponder the disparity between Ronald Hepburn's views and my own, I realized
that a basic philosophical difference underlies them. A pervasive rationalism and cognitive
privilege infuse Hepburn's defense of disinterestedness. Hepburn's argument, despite his
disclaimer, distinguishes aesthetic experience from other modes of experience and leads us
to differentiate non-art from complex art objects and natural ones experienced
aesthetically. For him the aesthetic enables us to turn away from the tedious concerns of
daily life. Doing this requires a distinction between art and non-art and between actual
situations and those depicted or symbolized in art. The rational discrimination among
genres, traditions, and styles is also part of the aesthetic process for him. Both procedures
involve categorical distinctions: between the aesthetic and the practical tedium of the
mundane, and between art and non-art. Such cognitive processes, I argue, are not
inherent in the appreciative act even though they may provide some criteria that we may
choose to use in guiding our aesthetic behavior. I, in contrast, insist on a continual
reference to appreciative experience and to the occasions that evoke it as the basis for an
account of the aesthetic.
Hepburn's sensitive defense of disinterestedness vividly illustrates the plausibility and
continuing influence of that doctrine. He regards the question of whether the aesthetic is a
separate mode of experience as the key question and he affirms such a separation. I claim
that aesthetic experience is distinctive though not separate, and that although it is not
always dominant, it is pervasive. If we think of aesthetic as intrinsic perception that is
focused, intense, and fraught with significance, there is no situation or object that cannot
be experienced aesthetically. Yet this experience is different from experience that is social,
practical, religious, or cognitive, even though such experiences are often conjoined with the
aesthetic. The dripping rain water that taps a regular pattern as it filters downward to rot
and undermine a house can, at the same time, play the very same role that the clicking of
train wheels did for Rossini in suggesting a musical figure. Similarly, a pervasively aesthetic
culture such as the Japanese can find no object or pursuit so lowly that it cannot be
enhanced by aestheticization.

Hepburn draws again on Kant in employing distance to deal with the sublime. By
summoning our resources of intellect and imagination, we are able to balance the powerful
sensory impact of overwhelming might or magnitude. We can then overcome "that
daunting sensory impact, and fuse both components into the one complex...experience of
the sublime." We see clearly here the use of such distancing as a cognitive act. Here,
perhaps, it may be thought of as complementary to the aesthetic one, but it is still a
different act, one that requires a shift of experience into an alternative mode.
Hepburn calls the juxtaposition of turbulence and inner calm a paradox in our appreciation
of nature. This juxtaposition is a puzzle only if one is committed to the doctrine of
disinterestedness, for such a "paradox" confuses the conditions for appreciation with the
act of appreciating, itself. It may be desirable and even necessary on certain occasions, but
it is not universally so. Thus there is a categorical confusion between conditions for
appreciation and the activity of appreciation, and between a conventional setting for
appreciative enjoyment and the activity itself. It does not require disengagement to take
an art-object on its own terms. The "system of my desires, longings and satisfactions" does
not require "some standing back here; at least enough to allow me to bring into a
synthesis, a single grasp, what is often a multitude of interdependent components."
Engagement allows these to enter, indeed it encourages recognizing and experiencing
these connections. The key word here is 'experiencing,' for experiencing such a confusion
of conditions may be central to the act of appreciation in such an instance, as it is in the
case of Anselm Kiefer's powerfully evocative paintings.
Similarly with emotions. Fictive situations may indeed lead us to face the same emotions of
helplessness and suffering evoked by such things as death. Insofar as such emotional
feelings are an integral part of the appreciative experience, there is no reason to exclude
them. But the knowledge that a situation is fictive may not diminish the emotional
response. Knowing that an object does not exist or that a situation did not actually occur
involves a cognitive act that may be aesthetically irrelevant. One's response to violence in
film, for example, may be intense and overwhelming, even intolerable, despite that
knowledge. As for the effectiveness of aesthetic disinterestedness in enabling the
articulation and refinement of such feelings, what is important, I believe is experiencing,
not conceptualizing, those feelings, which is what happens in art as aesthetic. We do not
need to face emotions from a safe distance in order to have powerful emotions clarified and
articulated. We need to encounter those emotions and live through them. Some of the
most powerful art breaks down our protective defences, including distancing, to engage us
in unforgettably intense feelings that we then must somehow work through.
Further, I believe that aesthetic theory has not a legislative function but rather a reactive
one. As aestheticians we are not the arbiters of what constitutes art at any time in the
history of cultures. This is ultimately a social decision made over time by the willingness
and ability of people to appreciate objects and activities in ways we understand as
aesthetic, and those ways themselves change. That there may be a circularity here is
unavoidable and even desirable. Social groups and societies develop characteristic modes
and patterns of experience. Philosophers have typically re-enforced such patterns in moral
philosophy, where our function should be more critically reflective and assist in the
evolution of ethical understanding. In aesthetic theory I believe we have a different
function, to explain our capacities for experience of the sort we call aesthetic and to assist
in the enhancement and enlargement of those capacities.
In citing Schopenhauer, Hepburn recognizes the strong appeal that disinterestedness has in
overcoming the forces of the everyday, interested world-narrowly self-seeking, anxious,
and turbulent. It is, put directly, a precious alternative to and an escape from that world,
an evasion it would be sad to lose. Aesthetic engagement offers us an alternative to that
violent but mundane world but not one that separates us from it. Engaging in the many
and various worlds of art is no escape but an entry through magic casements into new and
sometimes important regions of experience. Engagement rather forces us to confront that
world as it is presented to us in the arts and impels us to seek to change what is avoidable.
In that way, the theory becomes an instrument for betterment, not only because is it
unrelentingly direct but because it contains a vision of reconciliation and harmony.
Ronald Hepburn displays his characteristic graciousness in suggesting that he and I are not
so far apart. We do share an openness to the richness and many nuances of aesthetic
experience of both art and nature. But, yes, as Hepburn acknowledges, the differences

between us do matter. There is a difference, indeed, that underlies our differences: a
sophisticated yet clear conflict between an essentially rationalist approach and an empirical
one.
_________________________________________________________________________
Ronald Hepburn
Disinterestedness: Reply to Arnold Berleant's Reply
Is there any point, then, in reaffirming a view of aesthetic experience and the aesthetic
attitude which gives a central place to disinterestedness? In banishing the concept of
disinterestedness altogether, would we not be dismantling a gratuitous barrier, one that
isolates art from life (or, if you like, takes art to be an escape from life rather than
engagement with it), deprives art-emotions of their strength, directness and relevance,
interposes concepts and rational structures where there should be only unconceptualized
expression-and submits aesthetic appreciation of nature to some analogous distortions?
I do realize that the language of "disinterestedness" is open to a variety of understandable
misreadings and that it cannot serve as our sole key-concept in aesthetic theory, yet I am
not persuaded by these charges. Let me restate the core of the view I am defending (in
this friendly polemical exchange with Arnold Berleant):Disinterestedness should not be seen as an attitude that makes our aesthetic encounters
with art and nature something insipid or effete, their objects held at arm's length. We
should see it, rather, as basically a disconnecting, disentangling, from the flow of life's
projects, allowing wholehearted entry to the world of the art-work (or to nature out-ofrelation to our practical involvements in it), a vivifying and liberating of the imagination, so
as to follow and to reconstruct the intentions of an artist, or in the case of nature (with
markedly greater freedom) allowing us to improvize our own "natural" aesthetic object
from sensory and cognitive elements. Once constituted, art-objects or items of nature are
appreciated, enjoyed and valued for themselves. As the word "disinterestedness" intimates,
the basic thought is negative-"without interest", in the sense of not seeking to exploit or
possess, but only to experience, to appreciate, to grasp: everything else being subordinate
to these.
Arnold Berleant draws attention critically to places where I speak of concepts, categories,
rational discrimination among genres and traditions-as involved in aesthetic appreciation,
as internal to it. For my part, I cannot see that as part of a "distancing" process in a bad
sense, the outworking of an inappropriately rationalistic mind-set that allegedly goes with a
"disinterested" approach to aesthetic experience. I allow that, very occasionally (and very
briefly), we may have a purely sensuous, uninterpreted, experience: but immensely more
often interpretative concepts are at work helping to constitute our aesthetic experience,
even if not all their work is explicit and verbalized. They ask and answer the questions we
need in order to orientate ourselves with regard to our object of experience. For instance,
"Is this item a piece of nature or an artefact?" I shall experience it differently, depending
on which I decide it is. Or again, I can't avoid (ought not to avoid) asking, "Is this essay [or
piece of music, or painting] ironical?" Or: "Is this reworking of an ancient myth turning out
to be an entertaining but superficial fantasy, or a serious thinking-through of the human
situation today?" Questions like these and their answers are important elements in the
constructing of our appreciative experience; they are not added as an inessential
(rationalistic) supplement.
On "the sublime": when dualistic types of sublime experience combine sensory and
imaginative frustration or incapacity with a resurgent feeling of exhilaration, the latter may
well be founded on a recollecting, realizing and cherishing of features of personal life
(freedom, moral awareness, aesthetic sensitivity itself), features that are not measurable
on scales of magnitude or physical force. I do not see how concepts can be avoided in this
sort of context. If this "requires a shift of experience into a different mode" (A.B.), then
again I'd say, These components-sensuous and conceptual-can be fused into a single,
contemplative and moving experience, and are so in often-attested episodes of the
sublime. To me, there is no problem about including cognitive components within an
aesthetic whole. In general, aesthetic experiences would become greatly impoverished
without them.

Is art a mode of escape from life? From the chaotic and formless in life, it can be; but
"escape" is, in other ways and contexts, not at all appropriate. We may think of Goya's
Disasters of War or Picasso's Guernica.
On emotional intensity, Berleant writes: "Knowing that a situation is fictive may not
diminish the emotional response". I entirely agree. I may in fact experience more powerful
emotions concerning the vicissitudes of a fictional character (appreciated in disinterested
mode on stage or in a novel) than about a real life character in a similar situation. The
situation can indeed be imaginatively realized, "brought home", in art more vividly than is
often the case in everyday life, where emotional evasiveness or sluggishness may shield
me from that depth and fullness of response. I also commonly experience emotions in art
which I have never known in my life outside art (let us say, a leader's triumph in battle, or
the desolation of a child abandoned by its parents). Yes, the expressive resources of art
also "articulate" and "refine"-in the sense of giving definition, precision and particularity to
emotional qualities, getting beyond clichéd concepts, and in very effective art-I readily
admit-often beyond concepts altogether. (The arts can both use and transcend concepts.)
Such emotional particularity is the resultant of an "all-in" use of an art medium: in musicmelody, rhythm, timbre of instruments, musical forms, established and innovative-we
actively bring all of them into a single whole-to-perception, almost a world in itself, the
proper object (I have to say) of disinterested concentration.
The particularity of emotions in a fine work of art may, then, preclude conceptualizing with
any accuracy. While we experience emotions, let us say vis-à-vis death, as they are
expressed in an art-work such as Brahms' Requiem, we actively interrogate the work so as
to discover the particular quality Brahms has given these emotions; we are not made,
simply, to weep or shudder. We realize as we listen that here is a treatment of solemn,
grave emotions, emotions surrounding death, as expressed through the filter of a
nineteenth-century symphony orchestra and the personality of a particular composer, using
(but doing highly individual, original things with) the musical idioms of his day. And we
may ponder as we listen-how far can we make these, deeply valued, emotional qualities
our own, and learn to retrieve them in memory?
So Berleant and I agree about the ability of art to communicate emotions with peculiar
vividness and power. But since we (whether listeners, spectators or readers) remain aware
that it is the rich resources of art that are opening them to us-in the complex object-ofappreciation before us (or unfolding itself for us in sound)-I cannot see that as inconsistent
with my claims about disinterestedness: rather the reverse. Let us ask once again, and
finally for this "reply", What do those claims amount to in such cases? It is easy to oversimplify; perhaps the following is a little more adequate.
There is an important difference between our experience of emotion-fear, dejection, joy-in
non-aesthetic, everyday-life contexts, and in art. With art, we are aware that our fear has
no immediate object in our personal life: our anger no target, dejection or joy no specific
occasion in the episodes of our lives. When we give ourselves to tempestuous music, or to
music of great serenity, we realize that this is still our own sustained act, a self-surrender
that is always rescindable: we ourselves have put those experiences as it were within
brackets. But that does not dampen or extinguish their drama, their emotional force. These
persist; even though not as continuous with the dramas and emotions of our extraaesthetic lives. Nevertheless-for our subject is irreducibly, and happily, complex-life can
certainly come to draw upon aesthetic experiences such as these, often be nourished by
them over long periods. What has been "discontinuous" can, in part at least, be made once
more continuous, what has been "disengaged" we may re-engage and integrate.

